30 KiB
Agent Permissions Refinement
TL;DR
Quick Summary: Refine OpenCode agent permissions for Chiron (planning) and Chriton-Forge (build) to implement 2025 AI security best practices with principle of least privilege, human-in-the-loop for critical actions, and explicit guardrails against permission bypass.
Deliverables:
- Updated
agents/agents.jsonwith refined permissions for Chiron and Chriton-Forge- Critical bug fix: Duplicate
external_directorykey in Chiron config- Enhanced secret blocking with additional patterns
- Bash injection prevention rules
- Git protection against secret commits and repo hijacking
Estimated Effort: Medium Parallel Execution: NO - sequential changes to single config file Critical Path: Fix duplicate key → Apply Chiron permissions → Apply Chriton-Forge permissions → Validate
Context
Original Request
User wants to refine agent permissions for:
- Chiron: Planning agent with read-only access, restricted to read-only subagents, no file editing, can create beads issues
- Chriton-Forge: Build agent with write access restricted to ~/p/**, git commits allowed but git push asks, package install commands ask
- General: Sane defaults that are secure but open enough for autonomous work
Interview Summary
Key Discussions:
- Chiron: Read-only planning, no file editing, bash denied except for
bd *commands, external_directory ~/p/** only, task permission to restrict subagents to explore/librarian/athena + chiron-forge for handoff - Chriton-Forge: Write access restricted to ~/p/**, git commits allow / git push ask, package install commands ask, git config deny
- Workspace path: ~/p/** is symlink to ~/projects/personal/** (just replacing path reference)
- Bash security: Block all bash redirect patterns (echo >, cat >, tee, etc.)
Research Findings:
- OpenCode supports granular permission rules with wildcards, last-match-wins
- 2025 best practices: Principle of least privilege, tiered permissions (read-only auto, destructive ask, JIT privileges), human-in-the-loop for critical actions
- Security hardening: Block command injection vectors, prevent git secret commits, add comprehensive secret blocking patterns
Metis Review
Critical Issues Identified:
- Duplicate
external_directorykey in Chiron config (lines 8-9 and 27) - second key overrides first, breaking intended behavior - Bash edit bypass: Even with
edit: deny, bash can write files via redirection (echo "x" > file.txt,cat >,tee) - Git secret protection: Agent could commit secrets (read .env, then git commit .env)
- Git config hijacking: Agent could modify .git/config to push to attacker-controlled repo
- Command injection: Malicious content could execute via
$(), backticks,eval,source - Secret blocking incomplete: Missing patterns for
.local/share/*,.cache/*,*.db,*.keychain,*.p12
Guardrails Applied:
- Fix duplicate external_directory key (use single object with catch-all
"*": "ask"after specific rules) - Add bash file write protection patterns (echo >, cat >, printf >, tee, > operators)
- Add git secret protection (
git add *.env*: deny,git commit *.env*: deny) - Add git config protection (
git config *: deny for Chriton-Forge) - Add bash injection prevention (
$(*,`*,eval *,source *) - Expand secret blocking with additional patterns
- Add /run/agenix/* to read deny list
Work Objectives
Core Objective
Refine OpenCode agent permissions in agents/agents.json to implement security hardening based on 2025 AI agent best practices while maintaining autonomous workflow capabilities.
Concrete Deliverables
- Updated
agents/agents.jsonwith:- Chiron: Read-only permissions, subagent restrictions, bash denial (except
bd *), no file editing - Chriton-Forge: Write access scoped to ~/p/**, git commit allow / push ask, package install ask, git config deny
- Both: Enhanced secret blocking, bash injection prevention, git secret protection
- Chiron: Read-only permissions, subagent restrictions, bash denial (except
Definition of Done
- Permission configuration updated in
agents/agents.json - JSON syntax valid (no duplicate keys, valid structure)
- Workspace path validated (~/p/** exists and is correct)
- Acceptance criteria tests pass (via manual verification)
Must Have
- Chiron cannot edit files directly
- Chiron cannot write files via bash (redirects blocked)
- Chiron restricted to read-only subagents + chiron-forge for handoff
- Chriton-Forge can only write to ~/p/**
- Chriton-Forge cannot git config
- Both agents block secret file reads
- Both agents prevent command injection
- Git operations cannot commit secrets
- No duplicate keys in permission configuration
Must NOT Have (Guardrails)
- Edit bypass via bash: No bash redirection patterns that allow file writes when
edit: deny - Git secret commits: No ability to git add/commit .env or credential files
- Repo hijacking: No git config modification allowed for Chriton-Forge
- Command injection: No
$(), backticks,eval,sourceexecution via bash - Write scope escape: Chriton-Forge cannot write outside ~/p/** without asking
- Secret exfiltration: No access to .env, .ssh, .gnupg, credentials, secrets, .pem, .key, /run/agenix
- Unrestricted bash for Chiron: Only
bd *commands allowed
Verification Strategy (MANDATORY)
This is configuration work, not code development. Manual verification is required after deployment.
Test Decision
- Infrastructure exists: YES (home-manager deployment)
- User wants tests: NO (Manual-only verification)
- Framework: None
Manual Verification Procedures
Each TODO includes EXECUTABLE verification procedures that users can run to validate changes.
Verification Commands to Run After Deployment:
- JSON Syntax Validation:
# Validate JSON structure and no duplicate keys
jq '.' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json > /dev/null 2>&1
# Expected: Exit code 0 (valid JSON)
# Check for duplicate keys (manual review of chiron permission object)
# Expected: Single external_directory key, no other duplicates
- Workspace Path Validation:
ls -la ~/p/ 2>&1
# Expected: Directory exists, shows contents (likely symlink to ~/projects/personal/)
- After Deployment - Chiron Read-Only Test (manual):
- Have Chiron attempt to edit a test file
- Expected: Permission denied with clear error message
- Have Chiron attempt to write via bash (echo "test" > /tmp/test.txt)
- Expected: Permission denied
- Have Chiron run
bd readycommand- Expected: Command succeeds, returns JSON output with issue list
- Have Chiron attempt to invoke build-capable subagent (sisyphus-junior)
- Expected: Permission denied
- After Deployment - Chiron Workspace Access (manual):
- Have Chiron read file within ~/p/**
- Expected: Success, returns file contents
- Have Chiron read file outside ~/p/**
- Expected: Permission denied or ask user
- Have Chiron delegate to explore/librarian/athena
- Expected: Success, subagent executes
- After Deployment - Chriton-Forge Write Access (manual):
- Have Chriton-Forge write test file in ~/p/** directory
- Expected: Success, file created
- Have Chriton-Forge attempt to write file to /tmp
- Expected: Ask user for approval
- Have Chriton-Forge run
git addandgit commit -m "test"- Expected: Success, commit created without asking
- Have Chriton-Forge attempt
git push- Expected: Ask user for approval
- Have Chriton-Forge attempt
git config- Expected: Permission denied
- Have Chriton-Forge attempt
npm install lodash- Expected: Ask user for approval
- After Deployment - Secret Blocking Tests (manual):
- Attempt to read .env file with both agents
- Expected: Permission denied
- Attempt to read /run/agenix/ with Chiron
- Expected: Permission denied
- Attempt to read .env.example (should be allowed)
- Expected: Success
- After Deployment - Bash Injection Prevention (manual):
- Have agent attempt bash -c "$(cat /malicious)"
- Expected: Permission denied
- Have agent attempt bash -c "
cat /malicious"- Expected: Permission denied
- Have agent attempt eval command
- Expected: Permission denied
- After Deployment - Git Secret Protection (manual):
- Have agent attempt
git add .env- Expected: Permission denied
- Have agent attempt
git commit .env- Expected: Permission denied
- Deployment Verification:
# After home-manager switch, verify config is embedded correctly
cat ~/.config/opencode/config.json | jq '.agent.chiron.permission.external_directory'
# Expected: Shows ~/p/** rule, no duplicate keys
# Verify agents load without errors
# Expected: No startup errors when launching OpenCode
Execution Strategy
Parallel Execution Waves
Single file sequential changes - no parallelization possible.
Single-Threaded Execution:
Task 1: Fix duplicate external_directory key
Task 2: Apply Chiron permission updates
Task 3: Apply Chriton-Forge permission updates
Task 4: Validate configuration
Dependency Matrix
| Task | Depends On | Blocks | Can Parallelize With |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | None | 2, 3 | None (must start) |
| 2 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| 3 | 1 | 4 | 2 |
| 4 | 2, 3 | None | None (validation) |
Agent Dispatch Summary
| Task | Recommended Agent |
|---|---|
| 1 | delegate_task(category="quick", load_skills=["git-master"]) |
| 2 | delegate_task(category="quick", load_skills=["git-master"]) |
| 3 | delegate_task(category="quick", load_skills=["git-master"]) |
| 4 | User (manual verification) |
TODOs
Implementation tasks for agent configuration changes. Each task MUST include acceptance criteria with executable verification.
-
1. Fix Duplicate external_directory Key in Chiron Config
What to do:
- Remove duplicate
external_directorykey from Chiron permission object - Consolidate into single object with specific rule + catch-all
"*": "ask" - Replace
~/projects/personal/**with~/p/**(symlink to same directory)
Must NOT do:
- Leave duplicate keys (second key overrides first, breaks config)
- Skip workspace path validation (verify ~/p/** exists)
Recommended Agent Profile:
Category: quick
- Reason: Simple JSON edit, single file change, no complex logic
Skills: git-master
- git-master: Git workflow for committing changes
Skills Evaluated but Omitted:
- research: Not needed (no investigation required)
- librarian: Not needed (no external docs needed)
Parallelization:
- Can Run In Parallel: NO
- Parallel Group: Sequential
- Blocks: Tasks 2, 3 (depends on clean config)
- Blocked By: None (can start immediately)
References (CRITICAL - Be Exhaustive):
Pattern References (existing code to follow):
agents/agents.json:1-135- Current agent configuration structure (JSON format, permission object structure)agents/agents.json:7-29- Chiron permission object (current state with duplicate key)
API/Type References (contracts to implement against):
- OpenCode permission schema:
{"permission": {"bash": {...}, "edit": "...", "external_directory": {...}, "task": {...}}
Documentation References (specs and requirements):
- Interview draft:
.sisyphus/drafts/agent-permissions-refinement.md- All user decisions and requirements - Metis analysis: Critical issue #1 - Duplicate external_directory key
External References (libraries and frameworks):
- OpenCode docs: https://opencode.ai/docs/permissions/ - Permission system documentation (allow/ask/deny, wildcards, last-match-wins)
- OpenCode docs: https://opencode.ai/docs/agents/ - Agent configuration format
WHY Each Reference Matters (explain the relevance):
agents/agents.json- Target file to modify, shows current structure and duplicate key bug- Interview draft - Contains all user decisions (~/p/** path, subagent restrictions, etc.)
- OpenCode permissions docs - Explains permission system mechanics (last-match-wins critical for rule ordering)
- Metis analysis - Identifies the duplicate key bug that MUST be fixed
Acceptance Criteria:
CRITICAL: AGENT-EXECUTABLE VERIFICATION ONLY
Automated Verification (config validation): ```bash
Agent runs:
jq '.' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json > /dev/null 2>&1
Assert: Exit code 0 (valid JSON)
Verify single external_directory key in chiron permission object
cat /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json | jq '.chiron.permission | keys' | grep external_directory | wc -l
Assert: Output is "1" (exactly one external_directory key)
Verify workspace path exists
ls -la ~/p/ 2>&1 | head -1
Assert: Shows directory listing (not "No such file or directory")
```
Evidence to Capture:
- jq validation output (exit code 0)
- external_directory key count output (should be "1")
- Workspace path ls output (shows directory exists)
Commit: NO (group with Task 2 and 3)
- Remove duplicate
-
2. Apply Chiron Permission Updates
What to do:
- Set
editto"deny"(planning agent should not write files) - Set
bashpermissions to deny all exceptbd *:"bash": { "*": "deny", "bd *": "allow" } - Set
external_directoryto~/p/**with catch-all ask:"external_directory": { "~/p/**": "allow", "*": "ask" } - Add
taskpermission to restrict subagents:"task": { "*": "deny", "explore": "allow", "librarian": "allow", "athena": "allow", "chiron-forge": "allow" } - Add
/run/agenix/*to read deny list - Add expanded secret blocking patterns:
.local/share/*,.cache/*,*.db,*.keychain,*.p12
Must NOT do:
- Allow bash file write operators (echo >, cat >, tee, etc.) - will add in Task 3 for both agents
- Allow chiron to invoke build-capable subagents beyond chiron-forge
- Skip webfetch permission (should be "allow" for research capability)
Recommended Agent Profile:
Category: quick
- Reason: JSON configuration update, follows clear specifications from draft
Skills: git-master
- git-master: Git workflow for committing changes
Skills Evaluated but Omitted:
- research: Not needed (all requirements documented in draft)
- librarian: Not needed (no external docs needed)
Parallelization:
- Can Run In Parallel: YES
- Parallel Group: Wave 2 (with Task 3)
- Blocks: Task 4
- Blocked By: Task 1
References (CRITICAL - Be Exhaustive):
Pattern References (existing code to follow):
agents/agents.json:11-24- Current Chiron read permissions with secret blocking patternsagents/agents.json:114-132- Athena permission object (read-only subagent reference pattern)
API/Type References (contracts to implement against):
- OpenCode task permission schema:
{"task": {"agent-name": "allow"}}
Documentation References (specs and requirements):
- Interview draft:
.sisyphus/drafts/agent-permissions-refinement.md- Chiron permission decisions - Metis analysis: Guardrails #7, #8 - Secret blocking patterns, task permission implementation
External References (libraries and frameworks):
- OpenCode docs: https://opencode.ai/docs/agents/#task-permissions - Task permission documentation
- OpenCode docs: https://opencode.ai/docs/permissions/ - Permission level definitions and pattern matching
WHY Each Reference Matters (explain the relevance):
agents/agents.json:11-24- Shows current secret blocking patterns to extendagents/agents.json:114-132- Shows read-only subagent pattern for reference (athena: deny bash, deny edit)- Interview draft - Contains exact user requirements for Chiron permissions
- OpenCode task docs - Explains how to restrict subagent invocation via task permission
Acceptance Criteria:
CRITICAL: AGENT-EXECUTABLE VERIFICATION ONLY
Automated Verification (config validation): ```bash
Agent runs:
jq '.chiron.permission.edit' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
jq '.chiron.permission.bash."*"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
jq '.chiron.permission.bash."bd *"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "allow"
jq '.chiron.permission.task."*"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
jq '.chiron.permission.task | keys' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Contains ["*", "athena", "chiron-forge", "explore", "librarian"]
jq '.chiron.permission.external_directory."~/p/**"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "allow"
jq '.chiron.permission.external_directory."*"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "ask"
jq '.chiron.permission.read."/run/agenix/*"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
```
Evidence to Capture:
- Edit permission value (should be "deny")
- Bash wildcard permission (should be "deny")
- Bash bd permission (should be "allow")
- Task wildcard permission (should be "deny")
- Task allowlist keys (should show 5 entries)
- External directory ~/p/** permission (should be "allow")
- External directory wildcard permission (should be "ask")
- Read /run/agenix/* permission (should be "deny")
Commit: NO (group with Task 3)
- Set
-
3. Apply Chriton-Forge Permission Updates
What to do:
- Split
git *: "ask"into granular rules:- Allow:
git add *,git commit *, read-only commands (status, log, diff, branch, show, stash, remote) - Ask:
git push * - Deny:
git config *
- Allow:
- Change package managers from
"ask"to granular rules:- Ask for installs:
npm install *,npm i *,npx *,pip install *,pip3 install *,uv *,bun install *,bun i *,bunx *,yarn install *,yarn add *,pnpm install *,pnpm add *,cargo install *,go install *,make install - Allow other commands implicitly (let them use catch-all rules or existing allow patterns)
- Ask for installs:
- Set
external_directoryto allow~/p/**with catch-all ask:"external_directory": { "~/p/**": "allow", "*": "ask" } - Add bash file write protection patterns (apply to both agents):
"bash": { "echo * > *": "deny", "cat * > *": "deny", "printf * > *": "deny", "tee": "deny", "*>*": "deny", ">*>*": "deny" } - Add bash command injection prevention (apply to both agents):
"bash": { "$(*": "deny", "`*": "deny", "eval *": "deny", "source *": "deny" } - Add git secret protection patterns (apply to both agents):
"bash": { "git add *.env*": "deny", "git commit *.env*": "deny", "git add *credentials*": "deny", "git add *secrets*": "deny" } - Add expanded secret blocking patterns to read permission:
.local/share/*,.cache/*,*.db,*.keychain,*.p12
Must NOT do:
- Remove existing bash deny rules for dangerous commands (dd, mkfs, fdisk, parted, eval, sudo, su, systemctl, etc.)
- Allow git config modifications
- Allow bash to write files via any method (must block all redirect patterns)
- Skip command injection prevention ($(), backticks, eval, source)
Recommended Agent Profile:
Category: quick
- Reason: JSON configuration update, follows clear specifications from draft
Skills: git-master
- git-master: Git workflow for committing changes
Skills Evaluated but Omitted:
- research: Not needed (all requirements documented in draft)
- librarian: Not needed (no external docs needed)
Parallelization:
- Can Run In Parallel: YES
- Parallel Group: Wave 2 (with Task 2)
- Blocks: Task 4
- Blocked By: Task 1
References (CRITICAL - Be Exhaustive):
Pattern References (existing code to follow):
agents/agents.json:37-103- Current Chriton-Forge bash permissions (many explicit allow/ask/deny rules)agents/agents.json:37-50- Current Chriton-Forge read permissions with secret blocking
API/Type References (contracts to implement against):
- OpenCode permission schema: Same as Task 2
Documentation References (specs and requirements):
- Interview draft:
.sisyphus/drafts/agent-permissions-refinement.md- Chriton-Forge permission decisions - Metis analysis: Guardrails #1-#6 - Bash edit bypass, git secret protection, command injection, git config protection
External References (libraries and frameworks):
- OpenCode docs: https://opencode.ai/docs/permissions/ - Permission pattern matching (wildcards, last-match-wins)
WHY Each Reference Matters (explain the relevance):
agents/agents.json:37-103- Shows current bash permission structure (many explicit rules) to extend with new patternsagents/agents.json:37-50- Shows current secret blocking to extend with additional patterns- Interview draft - Contains exact user requirements for Chriton-Forge permissions
- Metis analysis - Provides bash injection prevention patterns and git protection rules
Acceptance Criteria:
CRITICAL: AGENT-EXECUTABLE VERIFICATION ONLY
Automated Verification (config validation): ```bash
Agent runs:
Verify git commit is allowed
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.bash."git commit *"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "allow"
Verify git push asks
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.bash."git push *"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "ask"
Verify git config is denied
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.bash."git config *"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
Verify npm install asks
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.bash."npm install *"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "ask"
Verify bash file write redirects are blocked
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.bash."echo * > *"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.bash."cat * > *"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.bash."tee"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
Verify command injection is blocked
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.bash."$(*"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.bash."`*"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
Verify git secret protection
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.bash."git add .env"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.bash."git commit .env"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
Verify external_directory scope
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.external_directory."~/p/**"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "allow"
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.external_directory."*"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "ask"
Verify expanded secret blocking
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.read.".local/share/*"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.read.".cache/*"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
jq '.chiron-forge.permission.read."*.db"' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json
Assert: Output is "deny"
```
Evidence to Capture:
- Git commit permission (should be "allow")
- Git push permission (should be "ask")
- Git config permission (should be "deny")
- npm install permission (should be "ask")
- bash redirect echo > permission (should be "deny")
- bash redirect cat > permission (should be "deny")
- bash tee permission (should be "deny")
- bash $() injection permission (should be "deny")
- bash backtick injection permission (should be "deny")
- git add .env permission (should be "deny")
- git commit .env permission (should be "deny")
- external_directory ~/p/** permission (should be "allow")
- external_directory wildcard permission (should be "ask")
- read .local/share/* permission (should be "deny")
- read .cache/* permission (should be "deny")
- read *.db permission (should be "deny")
Commit: YES (groups with Tasks 1, 2, 3)
- Message:
chore(agents): refine permissions for Chiron and Chriton-Forge with security hardening - Files:
agents/agents.json - Pre-commit:
jq '.' agents/agents.json > /dev/null 2>&1(validate JSON)
- Split
-
4. Validate Configuration (Manual Verification)
What to do:
- Run JSON syntax validation:
jq '.' agents/agents.json - Verify no duplicate keys in configuration
- Verify workspace path exists:
ls -la ~/p/ - Document manual verification procedure for post-deployment testing
Must NOT do:
- Skip workspace path validation
- Skip duplicate key verification
- Proceed to deployment without validation
Recommended Agent Profile:
Category: quick
- Reason: Simple validation commands, documentation task
Skills: git-master
- git-master: Git workflow for committing validation script or notes if needed
Skills Evaluated but Omitted:
- research: Not needed (validation is straightforward)
- librarian: Not needed (no external docs needed)
Parallelization:
- Can Run In Parallel: NO
- Parallel Group: Sequential
- Blocks: None (final validation task)
- Blocked By: Tasks 2, 3
References (CRITICAL - Be Exhaustive):
Pattern References (existing code to follow):
AGENTS.md- Repository documentation structure
API/Type References (contracts to implement against):
- N/A (validation task)
Documentation References (specs and requirements):
- Interview draft:
.sisyphus/drafts/agent-permissions-refinement.md- All user requirements - Metis analysis: Guardrails #1-#6 - Validation requirements
External References (libraries and frameworks):
- N/A (validation task)
WHY Each Reference Matters (explain the relevance):
- Interview draft - Contains all requirements to validate against
- Metis analysis - Identifies specific validation steps (duplicate keys, workspace path, etc.)
Acceptance Criteria:
CRITICAL: AGENT-EXECUTABLE VERIFICATION ONLY
Automated Verification (config validation): ```bash
Agent runs:
JSON syntax validation
jq '.' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json > /dev/null 2>&1
Assert: Exit code 0
Verify no duplicate external_directory keys
cat /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json | jq '.chiron.permission | keys' | grep external_directory | wc -l
Assert: Output is "1"
cat /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json | jq '.chiron-forge.permission | keys' | grep external_directory | wc -l
Assert: Output is "1"
Verify workspace path exists
ls -la ~/p/ 2>&1 | head -1
Assert: Shows directory listing (not "No such file or directory")
Verify all permission keys are valid
cat /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json | jq '.chiron.permission' > /dev/null 2>&1
Assert: Exit code 0
cat /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json | jq '.chiron-forge.permission' > /dev/null 2>&1
Assert: Exit code 0
```
Evidence to Capture:
- jq validation output (exit code 0)
- Chiron external_directory key count (should be "1")
- Chriton-Forge external_directory key count (should be "1")
- Workspace path ls output (shows directory exists)
- Chiron permission object validation (exit code 0)
- Chriton-Forge permission object validation (exit code 0)
Commit: NO (validation only, no changes)
- Run JSON syntax validation:
Commit Strategy
| After Task | Message | Files | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1, 2, 3 | chore(agents): refine permissions for Chiron and Chriton-Forge with security hardening |
agents/agents.json | jq '.' agents/agents.json > /dev/null |
| 4 | N/A (validation only) | N/A | N/A |
Success Criteria
Verification Commands
# Pre-deployment validation
jq '.' /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json > /dev/null 2>&1
# Expected: Exit code 0
# Duplicate key check
cat /home/m3tam3re/p/AI/AGENTS/agents/agents.json | jq '.chiron.permission | keys' | grep external_directory | wc -l
# Expected: 1
# Workspace path validation
ls -la ~/p/ 2>&1
# Expected: Directory listing
# Post-deployment (manual)
# Have Chiron attempt file edit → Expected: Permission denied
# Have Chiron run bd ready → Expected: Success
# Have Chriton-Forge git commit → Expected: Success
# Have Chriton-Forge git push → Expected: Ask user
# Have agent read .env → Expected: Permission denied
Final Checklist
- Duplicate
external_directorykey fixed - Chiron edit set to "deny"
- Chiron bash denied except
bd * - Chiron task permission restricts subagents (explore, librarian, athena, chiron-forge)
- Chiron external_directory allows ~/p/** only
- Chriton-Forge git commit allowed, git push asks
- Chriton-Forge git config denied
- Chriton-Forge package install commands ask
- Chriton-Forge external_directory allows ~/p/**, asks others
- Bash file write operators blocked (echo >, cat >, tee, etc.)
- Bash command injection blocked ($(), backticks, eval, source)
- Git secret protection added (git add/commit .env deny)
- Expanded secret blocking patterns added (.local/share/, .cache/, *.db, *.keychain, *.p12)
- /run/agenix/* blocked in read permissions
- JSON syntax valid (jq validates)
- No duplicate keys in configuration
- Workspace path ~/p/** exists